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CASE COMMENTS
Attorneys--Admission to Bar as Prerequisite of Holding Office
as Prosecuting Attorney
D was elected prosecuting attorney of a judicial circuit in Indiana,
although he never had been a member of the Indiana State Bar nor
had he ever been an attorney at law entitled to practice. No provision
of the constitution or statutes of Indiana specifically required a pro-
secuting attorney to be a lawyer admitted to practice. D attempted
to appear in circuit court, representing the State of Indiana in crimi-
nal cases. The Indiana State Bar Association sought a permanent
injunction to restrain his practice of law as a prosecuting attorney.
Held, in a three-two decision, prosecuting attorneys must be at-
torneys entitled to practice, and the state supreme court has the
exclusive jurisdiction to admit attorneys to the practice of law. Thus,
although D was elected prosecuting attorney, inasmuch as he had
not met the requirements for admission to the state bar, he was not
entitled to practice law as prosecuting attorney. State ex rel. Indiana
State Bar Ass'n v. Moritz, 191 N.E.2d 21 (ind. 1963).
At one time authorities differed on the question presented in the
principal case. This problem only arises when both the state con-
stitution creating the office and the statutes are silent on requiring
prosecuting attorneys to be members of the bar. Qualifications may
be prescribed by constitutions, but the legislature has the power to
fix reasonable qualifications, within constitutional limits, for those
who hold the office. In re Eary, 134 W. Va. 204, 58 S.E.2d 647
(1950). Where a constitution authorizes the legislature to enact all
wholesome and reasonable laws, a statute requiring a district attorney
to be a member of the bar was not unreasonable. In re Opinion of
Justices, 240 Mass. 611, 135 N.E. 305 (1922).
Two early cases had held that unless expressly required by con-
stitution or statute, the prosecuting attorney need not be an attorney
at law. It would appear to be beyond rules of construction to hold a
mere name given an office defines also the qualification of the holder
of the office. People ex rel. Galvin v. Dorsey, 32 Cal. 296 (1867).
In State v. Swan, 60 Kan. 461, 56 Pac. 750 (1899), the court held
that the office of county attorney could be held and the prescribed
duties performed by a disbarred lawyer or by a person who had
never been admitted to the bar, since he acted in the capacity of
[ 122 ]
1
Stone: Attorneys--Admission to Bar as Perquisite of Holding Office as Pr
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1964
CASE COMMENTS
agent for the state in discharging his official duties which were
prescribed by law. These holdings caused the California and Kansas
legislatures to adopt statutes requiring that candidates for the office
of prosecuting attorney be persons admitted to practice in the courts
of the state. 10 MINN. L. REv. 620 (1926).
It appears to be the general rule that prosecuting attorneys must
be attorneys at law entitled to practice even in the absence of specific
requirements of statutes or constitutions. 27 C.J.S. District and Pro-
secuting Attorneys § 4c (1959). The problem has been litigated in
a number of cases as most state constitutions and statutes contain
no specific provisions requiring prosecuting attorneys to be admitted
to practice as attorneys. "The word [attorney] . . . unless clearly
indicated otherwise, is construed as meaning attorney at law." BAL-
LENTINE, THE SELF-PRONOUNCING LAW DICTIONARY (abr. ed.
1948). The duties of a prosecuting attorney are concerned primarily
with representing the state in criminal matters before the courts.
Thus, the duties of a prosecutor and the name of the officer have
aided the courts in arriving at decisions when the problem has been
litigated.
An early case dealing with the problem was People ex rel. Hughes
v. May, 3 Mich. 598 (1855). The court held that it was not within
the power of the judiciary, or even the legislature, to annex exclusions
from office or qualifications for office when the constitution has
not established such exclusions or qualifications. But the word
"attorney" used in the name of the officer is understood by lawyer
and layman, both in its technical and popular sense, to have reference
to a class of persons who are by license constituted officers of courts
of justice and members of the legal profession. Even if this were
not so, when the nature and extent of the duties conferred upon the
prosecuting attorney are considered, along with their powers, the
framers of the constitution had no design to have these officers
not be attorneys at law. Any other decision would be repugnant
to sound and acknowledged principles of public policy. People ex
rel. Hughes v. May, supra.
In South Dakota, an attorney who had been disbarred was later
elected state's attorney. Neither the state constitution nor statutes
required state's attorney to be an attorney at law. By naming this
officer "state's attorney," the framers of the constitution precluded
any intention that the office could be held by any person, no matter
how learned in the law, if he had not been permitted to practice as
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an attorney and was not licensed as such when he sought to apply.
Danforth v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W.1021 (1909). The licensing
and disbarment of attorneys, while administrative in nature, are judi-
cial functions and within the inherent power of the court. In re Keen-
an, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E.2d 516 (1941); West Virginia State Bar
v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959); Annot., 137
A.L.R. 766 (1942). Attorneys thus become officers of the court,
and courts are vested with the power of discipline. To allow a dis-
barred attorney to serve as prosecuting attorney would take away
a part of the inherent power of the courts to control the practice of
law. It is necessary for proper conduct of the court's business that
it should have direct control over the attorneys practicing at its bar.
Fallon v. State, 8 Ga. App. 476, 69 S.E. 592 (1910).
In an Illinois case, a state's attorney was required to appear in
court to represent the state and was also given power to file
informations, sign indictments, and sue out writs of subpoena and
summons. The right to perform the prescribed duties was denied
by statute to one who was not a licensed attorney. Held, both logic
and the weight of authority required that a state's attorney who dis-
charges these duties must be licensed attorney. People v. Munson,
319 Ill. 596, 150 N.E. 280 (1925); 13 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 441
(1927). The name of the office, "prosecuting attorney," carries with
it the meaning that the officer must be an attorney at law rather
than an attorney in fact. Enge v. Cass, 28 N.D. 219, 148 N.W. 607
(1914); State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892).
In one recent case on the problem, People ex rel. Elliott v. Bene-
fiel, 405 Il. 500, 91 N.E.2d 427 (1950), the court summarized the
reasoning used in previous cases. A state's attorney will be disquali-
fied by the fact that he is not an attorney licensed to practice in
Illinois. This is the rule even though there is no express constitution-
al or statutory specification that a state's attorney must be an attorney
at law because of (1) the language of the constitution which created
the office, (2) the statute enumerating the duties of the state's
attorney, and (3) the provisions of the statute prohibiting persons not
admitted to the bar from the practice of law.
Minnesota appears to be the only state which does not prohibit
a layman from holding the office of prosecuting attorney. State ex
rel. Knappen v. Clough, 23 Minn. 17 (1876). But the state's current
statutes require a county attorney to be "learned in the law." 23
MINN. STAT. ANN. §388.01 (West Supp. 1962). However, there still
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appears to be nothing to prevent a layman, learned in the law but
without a license to practice law, from holding the office of county
attorney and then securing the necessary legal assistance from a
licensed attorney. State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313,
133 N.W. 857 (1911). Other courts have held that a prosecuting at-
torney must discharge the duties himself rather than to have them
discharged by his assistant. People ex rel. Livers v. Hanson, 290
Ill. 370, 125 N.E. 268 (1919); Danforth v. Egan, supra. The ap-
pointment of assistant state's attorney did not have the effect of
removing the disqualification of the state's attorney himself. People
ex rel. Elliott v. Benefiel, supra.
The problem could arise in West Virginia. West Virginia's Con-
stitution requires that a prosecuting attorney be elected by the voters
of each county, W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; the only qualification
is that no person shall be elected to any county office unless he be
a citizen entitled to vote. W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 2. No qualifica-
tions are found in the West Virginia Code pertaining to the office
of prosecuting attorney.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has consistently as-
serted that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise which the court
has the inherent power to grant or refuse. In re Eary, supra; In re
Adkins, 83 W. Va. 673, 98 S.E. 888 (1919). The judicial depart-
ment of the state has the inherent power to define, regulate, supervise
and control the practice of law and can put an end to unauthorized
practice wherever it is found to exist. West Virginia State Bar v.
Earley, supra. This power in the court is enhanced by two statutory
provisions: The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has the
power and right to grant or deny an applicant a license to practice
in West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ch. 30, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1961);
and it is unlawful for any person to appear as an attorney at law
for another in a court of record without first being duly admitted to
practice law in West Virginia. W. VA. CODE ch. 30, art. 2, § 4
(Michie 1961). Thus, our court clearly would have the power to
determine that a prosecuting attorney without a license to practice
law in West Virginia could not appear before courts of record.
It would appear that no amendment or legislation is needed in
West Virginia. The courts have the inherent power to admit persons
to practice law, to prescribe standards of conduct, and to discipline
and revoke licenses of persons whose unfitness to practice law had
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been duly established. West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, supra; 81
A.B.A. REP. 490 (1956). The State Bar Constitution and By-Laws
recognize the right of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
to control the bench and bar. In light of the inherent power of the
judiciary, along with the duties of the prosecuting attorney, his con-
stitutional name, and the above mentioned statutes, it appears that
West Virginia would follow the general rule that prosecuting attorneys
must be attorneys at law.
Ward Day Stone, Jr.
Conflict of Laws-Erosion of Lex Loci Delicti Theory
P, an automobile guest, brought this negligence action in New
York against defendant, host motorist's executrix, for injuries receiv-
ed in an Ontario, Canada accident. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Ontario's guest statute barred recovery,
and the guest appealed. Held, reversed. New York, as place where
parties resided, guest-host relationship arose, and automobile trip
began and was to end, rather than Ontario, as place of accident, had
dominant contacts and superior claim for the application of its law
upon question whether guest was barred merely because she was a
guest. Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279
(1963).
The principal case presents the interesting problem of whether the
law of the place of the tort shall invariably govern the availability
of relief, or whether the applicable choice of law rule should also
reflect a consideration of other factors relevant to the purposes to be
served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy? The instant de-
cision provides a major breakthrough in the judicial struggle to
abandon the strict place-of-the-wrong theory.
The traditional choice of law rule has been that the substantive
rights and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are deter-
mined by the law of the place of the tort. GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 92 (3rd ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
378 (1934). This is the general rule prevailing throughout the various
jurisdictions of this country. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Glascock,
187 Ark. 343, 59 S.W.2d 602 (1933); Ryan v. Scanlon, 117 Conn.
428, 168 Atl. 17 (1933); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Barney, 262 Ky. 228,
90 S.W.2d 14 (1936). The rule owes its theoretical foundation to
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